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I. INTRODUCTION
During the almost ninety years since passage of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (FAA),1 the United States judiciary has stood the old com-
mon law hostility toward arbitration on its head.  Whereas once
arbitration agreements were disfavored and regarded as revocable at
will by either party,2 the federal judiciary has now taken to heart the
maxim that there is a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements.”3
The embrace of a policy favoring arbitration is particularly evident
in decisions of the United States Supreme Court over the last few de-
cades.  In 1985, the Supreme Court declared “we are well past the
time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of
the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbi-
tration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”4  In three re-
cent decisions, the Supreme Court has preferred an expansive reading
of the FAA: the Supreme Court has held a party’s claim that the entire
contract containing an arbitration clause was illegal and void ab initio
should be decided by the contract arbitrator rather than a court;5 the
arbitration agreement in a collective bargaining agreement between a
1. 9 U.S.C §§ 1–16 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Memphis Trust Co. v. Brown-Ketchum Iron Works, 166 F. 398, 402 (6th
Cir. 1909); U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006,
1007–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); Meacham v. Jamestown, Franklin & Clearfield R.R.
Co., 105 N.E. 653, 655 (N.Y. 1914).  For an interesting and thoughtful discussion
of the history of the common law rule against enforcing agreements to arbitrate,
see Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982–84 (2d
Cir. 1942). Kulukundis Shipping discusses the usual reason given for historical
judicial hostility to arbitration, which is reluctance by courts to surrender a part
of their jurisdiction. Id.  Kulukundis Shipping, however, also notes that there is
some historical support for the proposition that the common law rule against en-
forcing arbitration agreements was due to the desire of English judges, “at a time
when their salaries came largely from fees, to avoid loss of income.” Id. at 983.
3. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
4. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–27
(1985).
5. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
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union and an employer may preclude an individual employee from liti-
gating a statutory claim;6 and a state statute prohibiting the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements that do not allow for class actions is
preempted by the FAA.7  These cases illustrate a strong trend in the
Supreme Court toward an expansive reading of the FAA and a vigor-
ous enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.
Despite that trend, however, there are still circumstances under
which a party that wishes to litigate a contractual dispute will not be
forced to arbitrate.  The FAA states that federal courts are to order
parties to arbitration only “upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in
issue.”8  Consistent with that dictate, it is a fundamental tenet of
American arbitration law that “a party cannot be required to submit
to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”9  To
determine whether a particular contractual dispute is one that the
parties have agreed to arbitrate, the federal judiciary has developed
common law rules of arbitrability.  Although the law of arbitrability is
largely based on the terms of the FAA and has now had almost ninety
years to develop, it remains confused and confusing in some aspects.
In part, the confusion is attributable to the ad hoc nature of the com-
mon law method by which the law of arbitrability developed.10  It is
also partially attributable to the necessarily circular nature of the
arbitrability inquiry, which requires a court to decide the issue of
whether it should decide an issue.11
One aspect of the law of arbitrability on which the federal courts so
far have been unable to agree concerns whether a party that partici-
pates in the litigation of a dispute has waived its right to arbitrate
that dispute.12  It sometimes occurs that parties to a contract with a
6. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
7. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
8. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
9. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960).
10. See George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial Ar-
bitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 50 (2012) (“The progression [of American arbi-
trability law] has admittedly been non-linear and has produced considerable
doctrinal complexity.”)
11. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), provides an exam-
ple of the type of conundrum created by this type of meta-analysis.  In Buckeye,
the party opposing arbitration argued that the relevant contract was illegal and,
therefore, void ab initio.  If the issue of whether the contract was illegal was sent
to the arbitrator and determined in the affirmative, then the arbitrator would be
ruling that the contract that putatively gave him power to decide the matter was
void.  On the other hand, if a court decided the issue and determined that the
contract was not illegal, the court would be deciding that it never should have
been given the issue in the first place. Id. at 448–49.
12. Compare, e.g., Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388,
390 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying “presumptive waiver of the right to arbitrate” by
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valid arbitration provision decide to litigate instead of arbitrate.  That
situation presents no obvious procedural problem so long as both par-
ties agree to waive the right to arbitrate and then litigate their dis-
pute through to conclusion.  A problem does arise, however, if at some
stage during the litigation process one of the parties changes its mind
about its preferred forum and moves to compel arbitration instead.
Under what circumstances has a party that wishes to switch from liti-
gation to arbitration waived its contractual right to compel arbitra-
tion?  For example, may a litigant decide as the jury is being charged
at the end of a trial that it would like to invoke the arbitration clause
in the contract after all?  At the opposite end of the spectrum of pos-
sibilities, should the rule be that once a party voluntarily participates
in litigation to any extent it has waived its right to compel arbitration
of the same dispute?  If the best answer is somewhere between those
two poles, where is the point of no return, beyond which a party par-
ticipating in litigation will be held to have waived its right to
arbitrate?
This Article proposes answers to the above questions.  To do so, the
first Part of the Article reviews the current state of the law of arbi-
trability, which provides the framework within which the issue of
waiver by participation in litigation must be analyzed.  The second
Part of this Article examines the different ways that the United States
circuit courts have attempted to deal with the issue of when participa-
tion in litigation will be found to constitute a waiver of the right to
arbitrate.  The most fundamental split in the circuits on that issue
concerns whether some prejudice to the party resisting arbitration is a
necessary element of such a waiver.13  In addition, even among those
circuits that require a showing of prejudice, there is disagreement as
to what type of showing is required.  The third Part of this Article
proposes a uniform resolution of the issue of when a party’s participa-
tion in litigation should be found to constitute a waiver of the contrac-
tual right to arbitrate.  It is argued that a rule that does not require a
showing of prejudice to the party resisting arbitration better effectu-
ates the policies of the FAA.  Rather, the goal of fair and efficient dis-
pute resolution in conformity with the parties’ agreement is better
served by a rule that the contractual right to compel arbitration of a
participation in litigation), with Cargill Ferrous Int’l v. Sea Phoenix MV, 325
F.3d 695, 700–01 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying “presumption against” waiver of the
right to arbitrate by participation in litigation).
13. In Stok & Associates, P.A. v. Citibank, N.A., the Supreme Court granted a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari to decide the issue of whether prejudice was a neces-
sary element of a waiver by litigation.  Stok & Assocs., P.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 387
F. App’x 921 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011).  The writ was
dismissed, however, when the case settled prior to review by the Supreme Court.
Stok & Assocs. v. Citibank, N.A., 131 S. Ct. 2955 (2011).
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dispute is waived if it is not asserted by the time the defendant an-
swers the complaint.
II. THE LAW OF ARBITRABILITY FRAMEWORK
As the Supreme Court has noted, the word “arbitrability” is used in
two different senses—one broad and the other narrow.14  In the broad
sense, “arbitrability” can refer to “any potentially dispositive gateway
question” that might prevent a determination on the merits by an ar-
bitrator.15  For example, one party to a contractual dispute might ar-
gue to an arbitrator that the other party’s claim is time-barred.  In
such a circumstance, the arbitrator might rule on the issue of “arbi-
trability,” that is, whether the claim is time-barred, before considering
the merits of the underlying claim.16  In the narrow, more technical
sense, the word “arbitrability” refers to the question of whether an
arbitrator should be considering the gateway question at all or if the
gateway question is one that should be decided by a court.17  Both
senses of the word are relevant to the issue of when a party’s partici-
pation in litigation will constitute a waiver of the right to arbitrate.
The law is currently unsettled both as to who should decide issues of
waiver by participation in litigation18 and as to what standard the
decision maker should be apply.19
A. The FAA
Any discussion of the modern American law of arbitrability must
begin with a review of the provisions of the FAA.  Prior to enactment
of the FAA, the courts of the United States followed the old English
common law rule that parties were free to breach an agreement to
arbitrate so long as an arbitration award had not been issued yet.  The
reason that was typically given for this judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements was that such agreements were contrary to public pol-
icy.20  When the FAA was enacted in 1925, Congress effectively over-
ruled the common law hostility to arbitration agreements and
established a new public policy that placed an agreement to arbitrate
“upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.”21
14. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002).
15. Id.
16. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 287–89 (Alan Miles Ruben
ed., 6th ed. 2003).
17. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83–84.
18. See infra notes 95–104 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 105–89 and accompanying text.
20. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982–84 (2d
Cir. 1942).
21. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
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The FAA’s impact is wide reaching.  By its terms it applies to “any
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce.”22  The Supreme Court construed the legislatively unique
words “involving commerce” to mean the same thing as “affecting com-
merce” and held that the FAA was intended to be a full exercise of
Congress’s constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce.23
The FAA states that it does not “apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce.”24  The Supreme Court, however, con-
strued that limiting phrase narrowly.  Applying the doctrine of ejus-
dem generis, the Court found that Congress only intended to exclude
contracts for employment of workers engaged in transportation.25  In
addition, the Supreme Court found that the FAA preempts state law
and that state courts cannot invalidate arbitration agreements by ap-
plying state statutes.26  The FAA, therefore, with only limited excep-
tions, applies to almost any arbitration agreement in the United
States so long as the underlying transaction affects interstate
commerce.27
Section 2 of the FAA provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereaf-
ter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.28
Section 2 thus explicitly ends the common law rule that agreements to
arbitrate are revocable by either party prior to the issuance of an arbi-
tration award.  In the same sentence, however, the FAA acknowledges
that there will be instances in which arbitration agreements will not
be enforceable; such agreements may be held invalid, revocable, and
unenforceable on “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”29  That language is the genesis of the oft-
22. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
23. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–77 (1995).
24. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
25. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113–21 (2001).
26. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 272.
27. See id. at 281.  Because the courts construed the scope of the interstate commerce
clause more narrowly prior to West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937),
the reach of the FAA is considerably greater than what Congress probably envi-
sioned when it passed the statute in 1925.  The Supreme Court justified its ex-
pansive reading of the scope of the FAA on the ground that it is not “unusual” for
the Court to “ask whether the scope of a statue should expand along with the
expansion of the Commerce Clause power itself, and to answer the question af-
firmatively.” Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 275.
28. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
29. Id.
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repeated judicial observation that “the purpose of Congress in 1925
was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts,
but not more so.”30
Section 3 of the FAA provides a procedure by which a party to liti-
gation may assert that the matter should be arbitrated instead of liti-
gated.  Section 3 is similar to Section 2 in that it requires that
agreements to arbitrate be enforced, but in the same sentence, it also
acknowledges that not every contractual dispute is arbitrable.  Section
3 states:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for
such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied
that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration
under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the
trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the
terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default
in proceeding with such arbitration.31
The federal courts are thus required to stay litigation pending arbitra-
tion when an issue is “referable to arbitration” but only after “being
satisfied that the issue . . . is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement.”32  Furthermore, even if the issue is otherwise referable to
arbitration, the litigation will not be stayed if the applicant for the
stay is “in default in proceeding with such arbitration.”33
Section 4 of the FAA provides a procedural remedy in federal dis-
trict court for a complaining party to an arbitration agreement when
the other party refuses to participate in arbitration.  Pursuant to Sec-
tion 4, the district court is to hear the parties and order them to pro-
ceed to arbitration “upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in
issue.”34
Taken together, sections 2, 3, and 4 of the FAA provide the founda-
tion of the American law of arbitrability.  They establish that arbitra-
tion agreements are to be enforced by federal courts, unless there are
grounds under the law of contracts for revocation of the arbitration
30. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967); see
also, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)
(supporting the proposition that Congress intended to put arbitration agreements
on an “equal footing” with other contracts with language from § 2 of the FAA);
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293–94 (2002) (“The FAA directs
courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other con-
tracts . . . .”); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leeland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (“[The FAA] simply requires courts to enforce
privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance
with their terms.”).
31. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 4.
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agreement.  Federal district courts are to stay litigation and compel
arbitration only after being satisfied that the matter in dispute is ref-
erable under an agreement to arbitrate.  Even if the issue in dispute is
referable under a valid agreement to arbitrate, a federal court still
might decline to enforce the agreement if the party seeking to avoid
litigation is “in default in proceeding with such arbitration.”35  The
FAA, therefore, requires the federal courts to perform certain gate-
keeper functions when the parties to a contractual dispute disagree
whether they should proceed to arbitration.
B. The Scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate
It sometimes occurs that the parties to a dispute agree that there is
an agreement to arbitrate but disagree as to whether the particular
dispute falls within the scope of that agreement.  The landmark case
of United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.36
is an example of such a disagreement.  In Warrior & Gulf, an em-
ployer and a union had a contract that provided for arbitration of “dif-
ferences . . . as to the meaning and application of this agreement” or in
the event of “any local trouble of any kind.”37  The same contract, how-
ever, also provided that “matters which are strictly a function of man-
agement” would not be arbitrated.38  When the employer contracted
out certain work and laid off some of the employees, the union went to
federal district court to compel the employer to go to arbitration.  The
district court declined to order the parties to arbitration on the ground
that the contracting out of work was a function of management not
limited by the contract.  The court of appeals affirmed.39
On review, the Supreme Court agreed that the question of whether
the employer breached its duty to arbitrate was a matter for the
courts to determine because “a party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”40  In
making that determination, however, the court’s inquiry
must be strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did
agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator power to
make the award he made.  An order to arbitrate the particular grievance
should not be denied unless it can be said with positive assurance that the
35. Id. § 3.
36. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).  As is typical in cases involving collective bargaining agreements, Warrior
& Gulf was analyzed under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
rather than under the FAA. Id. at 577 & n.1.  Cases involving the FAA and the
Labor Management Relations Act “employ the same rules of arbitrability.”  Gran-
ite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 n.6 (2010).
37. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 576.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 577.
40. Id. at 582.
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arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the as-
serted dispute.  Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.41
Furthermore, in determining arbitrability “the court should view with
suspicion an attempt to persuade it to become entangled in the con-
struction of the substantive provisions” of the underlying contract.42
Warrior & Gulf sets forth the basic framework for determining
challenges to arbitrability based on the scope of the arbitration clause.
The issue of whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate a particular
dispute is for a court to decide in the first instance.  In making that
decision, however, the court must resolve “any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues” in favor of arbitration.43  So long as there is
a contract with an arbitration clause, “there is a presumption of
arbitrability.”44
Although, as a general rule, a court is to decide in the first instance
whether a particular dispute is within the scope of an agreement to
arbitrate, the parties can circumvent that rule by stating in their
agreement that all issues of arbitrability are to be determined by the
arbitrator.  To be effective, such a statement must be clear and unmis-
takable.45  Any ambiguity in an arbitration agreement as to whether a
court or an arbitrator should determine the issue of arbitrability will
be resolved in favor of the court making the determination.46
C. Procedural Arbitrability
A party to an arbitration agreement will sometimes object to the
arbitration because the complaining party failed to meet some proce-
dural requirement, such as commencing the arbitration within a cer-
tain amount of time.  The Supreme Court has determined that such
issues of procedural arbitrability are to be treated differently than is-
sues of whether the substance of the dispute falls within the scope of
an agreement to arbitrate.  While substantive objections concerning
the scope of the agreement to arbitrate are to be determined by a court
in the first instance,47 procedural objections are to be determined by
an arbitrator.48
The Supreme Court has given two basic reasons for assigning is-
sues of procedural arbitrability to contract arbitrators.  First, contract
41. Id. at 582–83.
42. Id. at 585.
43. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985) (citing Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582–83).
44. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (citing
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582–83).
45. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (citing Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582–83).
46. Id. at 944–45.
47. See supra notes 36–46 and accompanying text.
48. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83–86 (2002).
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arbitrators may be “comparatively more expert” than the courts at ap-
plying the procedural requirements of the parties’ contract.49  Second,
“parties to an arbitration contract would normally expect a forum-
based decision maker to decide forum-specific procedural gateway
matters.”50  As discussed below, both of those considerations are rele-
vant to the issue of whether parties that participate in litigation waive
their right to arbitrate.51
D. Allegations Concerning the Validity of the Entire
Contract
A party to a putative arbitration agreement might object that the
entire agreement between the parties is void, illegal, or otherwise le-
gally unenforceable.  For example, the party resisting arbitration
might argue the contract violates state law52 or was fraudulently in-
duced.53  Arguably, if the entire contract containing an arbitration
agreement is void or revocable, then the agreement to arbitrate is also
void or revocable.  Such a result would seem to be consistent with Sec-
tion 2 of the FAA, which provides that agreements to arbitrate are
“enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”54
The Supreme Court, however, determined that objections to the
enforceability of the entire contract should be addressed to the con-
tract arbitrator, not to a court.  In reaching that result, the Court ap-
plied the doctrine of severability.  Pursuant to that doctrine, as a
matter of substantive federal arbitration law, “an arbitration provi-
sion is severable from the remainder of the contract.”55  Unless the
ground for challenging the enforceability of the contract applies specif-
ically to the arbitration provision itself (for example, if it is alleged
that the arbitration provision, rather than the entire contract, was
fraudulently induced), then the issue of whether the contract is en-
forceable will be referred to the contract arbitrator in the first
instance.56
49. Id. at 85.
50. Id. at 86.
51. See infra notes 200–03 and accompanying text.
52. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 US 346 (2008).
53. See Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
54. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
55. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006).
56. Id. at 445–46; see also Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 400–04 (distinguishing between
state law claims of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract and claims
relating specifically to the arbitration clause of a contract).
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E. Allegations Concerning the Formation of the Entire
Contract
The issue of whether the underlying contract is unenforceable is
different from the issue of whether a contract was ever formed at all.
In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardenga, the party resisting arbi-
tration argued that the contract at issue was void ab initio because it
violated Florida lending and consumer protection laws.57  The Su-
preme Court applied the doctrine of severability and held the dispute
should be referred to the contract arbitrator because the claim of ille-
gality went to the contract as a whole, not to the arbitration provision
specifically.58  In reaching that conclusion, however, the Court noted
“[t]he issue of the contract’s validity is different from the issue [of]
whether any agreement between the alleged obligor and obligee was
ever concluded.”59  The Buckeye decision, therefore, does not address
arbitrability challenges that allege the obligor never signed the con-
tract, lacked authority, or lacked capacity.60  The subsequent decision
of Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, how-
ever, does address the problem of arbitrability challenges based on
contract formation.61
In Granite Rock, the contract between a union and employer ex-
pired, and the union went on strike.62  The union and employer then
negotiated a new contract with a no-strike clause and an arbitration
clause.  The new contract was putatively ratified by a vote of the union
membership.  The union, however, contended that the ratification vote
was flawed, and the union members did not return to work until a
second ratification vote was held more than a month later.  The em-
ployer sued the union for damages it sustained as a result of the work
stoppage that occurred between the first and second votes.  The union
contended that the issue of whether the contract was validly ratified
by the first vote was a question for the contract arbitrator to decide.63
The Supreme Court, however, held that the issue of when the contract
was ratified was an issue of formation and, therefore, was not
arbitrable.64
The Granite Rock Court reasoned that the federal policy favoring
arbitration of labor disputes “cannot be divorced from the first princi-
57. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 443.
58. Id. at 442–45.
59. Id. at 444 n.1.
60. Id.
61. Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
62. Id. at 2853.  Although Granite Rock was a labor relations case arising under the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), the Court’s decision relies on cases
decided under both the LMRA and the FAA because both statutes “employ the
same rules of arbitrability.” Id. at 2857 n.6.
63. Id. at 2853–55.
64. Id. at 2860–61.
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 53 Side A      08/28/2013   10:13:22
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 53 Side A      08/28/2013   10:13:22
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-1\NEB104.txt unknown Seq: 12 14-AUG-13 9:55
2013] TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY 97
ple that underscores all of our arbitration decisions: Arbitration is
strictly ‘a matter of consent.’”65  Applying that principle, arbitration
should not be ordered unless the court is first satisfied that the forma-
tion of the agreement is not an issue.  Because the issue of when the
contract was validly ratified was a formation issue, it was an issue for
the court rather than an arbitrator.66  Taken together, Granite Rock
and Buckeye Check Cashing establish a rule that issues of contract
validity are for the contract arbitrator to determine, but issues of con-
tract formation are for a court to determine.67
F. Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate Generally
It is a well-established principle of contract law that contract
rights can be waived.68  That principle includes the possibility that a
party to a contract might waive the right to arbitrate and instead
choose to litigate.69  The waiver of the right to arbitrate may be either
expressly stated by a party to a contract, or it may be established by
“undisputed acts or language so inconsistent with a purpose to stand
on the contract provisions as to leave no opportunity for a reasonable
inference to the contrary.”70
This Article discusses the issue of when participation in litigation
will constitute a waiver of the contractual right to arbitrate in Parts
III and IV.71  It is, however, also possible for a party to a contract to
waive the right to arbitrate by means other than participation in liti-
gation.  For example, a party that had ignored correspondence seeking
to arbitrate a claim was not permitted to use arbitration as a defense
in subsequent litigation.72  Similarly, a party that had disclaimed any
obligation to arbitrate was found to have waived the right to later in-
sist on arbitration.73
65. Id. at 2857 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leeland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
66. Id. at 2860–61.
67. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 & n.1 (distin-
guishing the issue of contract validity from the issue of whether contract was ever
concluded); Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2855–56 (noting issues concerning con-
tract formation are generally for courts to decide).
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 cmt. a–b (1979); E. ALLAN FARNS-
WORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.5 (3d ed. 2004).
69. See 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 105 (2007) (“The right to arbi-
trate given by a contract may be waived.”).
70. Id.
71. See infra notes 90–256 and accompanying text.
72. Blake Const. Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir. 1958).
73. Baker & Taylor, Inc. v. AlphaCraze.com Corp., 602 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2010)
(per curiam); see also Brown v. Dillard’s Inc., 430 F.3d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir. 2005)
(denying an employer the contractual right to compel an employee’s participation
in arbitration after the employer refused to participate in the employee’s prior
attempt to initiate arbitration).
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There is broad, but not universal, agreement that waiver by con-
duct other than litigation is a gateway issue that should be decided by
an arbitrator rather than a court.74  Courts considering that issue
have been significantly influenced by a sentence in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.75  In How-
sam, the Court considered the issue of whether a court or an arbitra-
tor should determine if a party’s claim was time-barred pursuant to a
procedural rule of the agreed upon arbitral forum requiring that dis-
putes be submitted within six years of the underlying occurrence.  As
discussed above, the Court ruled that such procedural issues are pre-
sumptively for an arbitrator to decide.76  After reaching that determi-
nation, the Howsam Court stated, “So, too, the presumption is that the
arbitrator should decide ‘allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense
to arbitrability.’”77
Despite the above-quoted sentence from Howsam, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals has held the issue of whether a party’s prelitigation
conduct constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate is an issue for a
court to decide.  In JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings, Inc., the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant waived its right to arbitration by state-
ments made in correspondence sent to the plaintiff prior to the com-
mencement of the litigation.78  The defendant, relying on Howsam,
argued that the issue of waiver should be referred to the contract arbi-
trator.  The Sixth Circuit, however, ruled that Howsam’s statement
about “waiver, delay or a like defense to arbitrability” must be read in
context and was only meant to refer to “defenses arising from non-
compliance with contractual conditions precedent to arbitration, such
as the NASD time limit rule at issue in that case.”79  Because the
waiver alleged in JPD was conduct-based rather than “contractually-
based,” the Sixth Circuit held the question of whether the right to ar-
bitrate had been waived was for a court to decide.80
74. See JAY. E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 6:38 (3d ed. 2005);
Michael P. Scharpf, Note, Court v. Arbitrator: Who Should Decide Whether Preli-
tigation Conduct Waives the Right to Compel an Arbitration Agreement?, 84 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 363, 364–65 (2010).
75. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
76. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
77. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)).
78. JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings, Inc., 539 F.3d 388, 393 (6th Cir. 2008).
79. Id. at 393–94.  In support of its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit cites cases involving
waiver of the right to arbitration by participation in litigation. Id.  As is dis-
cussed below, however, there are significant reasons for having a court decide
issues of waiver by litigation, which are not applicable to cases involving waiver
by other conduct. See infra notes 194–207 and accompanying text; see also,
Scharpf, note 74, at 382–89 (arguing that waiver by prelitigation conduct should
be for arbitrator to decide).
80. JPD, Inc., 539 F.3d at 394.
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In light of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in JPD, the issue of who
should decide whether there has been a waiver of the right to arbi-
trate by conduct other than participation in litigation remains unset-
tled.81  It is likely to remain unsettled until the Supreme Court
clarifies what it meant by the phrase “waiver, delay, or a like defense
of arbitrability” in Howsam.82 As is discussed below, the courts are
similarly struggling with how to apply Howsam to cases involving al-
legations of waiver by participation in litigation.83
G. Conclusions Concerning the Law of Arbitrability
There are two overriding principles that guide the federal courts in
determining issues of arbitrability.  First, there is a strong federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration.84  Second, parties will not be forced to arbi-
trate absent an agreement to do so.85  The Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Granite Rock makes it clear that the policy favoring arbi-
tration is not so strong that it can overcome the lack of an agreement
to arbitrate.86  The two overriding principles, therefore, can be func-
tionally combined into a single guiding policy that the courts should
vigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.  That policy is consistent
with the FAA, which requires judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements, but only after the court is satisfied that there is an agree-
ment to arbitrate the relevant issue.87
In the absence of a comprehensive legislative scheme addressing
issues of arbitrability, the federal courts have developed various doc-
trines, such as substantive arbitrability, procedural arbitrability, sev-
erability, and waiver.88  All of those doctrines seek to further the
policy of vigorous enforcement of agreements to arbitrate so long as
there is an agreement to arbitrate.89  The question of when participa-
tion in litigation will constitute a waiver of the right to arbitrate
81. Compare JPD, Inc., 539 F.3d at 394 (holding Howsam does not prevent court
from determining issue of waiver by inconsistent conduct), with Mulvaney Mech.,
Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local 38, 351 F.3d 43, 45–46 (2d Cir.
2003) (holding pursuant to Howsam that an allegation that party’s inconsistent
conduct repudiated the agreement should be referred to arbitrator).
82. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84.
83. See infra notes 96–104 and accompanying text.
84. See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83.
85. See United Steel Workers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960).
86. Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l. Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010).
87. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2–4 (2006).
88. See supra notes 36–83 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Granite Rock Co., 130 S. Ct. at 2857 (policy favoring arbitration “cannot
be divorced from” principle of consent); Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83 (policy favors
arbitration, but parties must have agreed to submit dispute); Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582 (policy favors settlement of disputes through ar-
bitration, but the parties must have agreed to arbitrate).
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should be addressed within the framework of those doctrines and in
conformity with that policy.
III. THE VARIOUS APPROACHES TO WAIVER BY
PARTICIPATION IN LITIGATION
Section 3 of the FAA provides that federal courts should grant an
application to stay litigation of “any issue referable to arbitration
under an agreement in writing for such arbitration” but only if “the
applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitra-
tion.”90  There is general agreement among the circuit courts that the
term “default” in Section 3 should, under appropriate circumstances,
be read to include waiver of the right to arbitrate by participation in
litigation.91  The circuit courts, however, have taken varying ap-
proaches to determining when participation in litigation will consti-
tute a waiver of the right to arbitrate.  The most significant split in
the circuits in this regard concerns whether the party resisting arbi-
tration must show prejudice in order to establish that the other party
waived its right to arbitrate.  Nine circuits clearly require a showing of
prejudice before such a waiver will be found.92  Three circuits do not
require a showing of prejudice, and two of those three have created a
presumption that a party that participates in litigation waives its
right to arbitrate.93  The circuits that require a showing of prejudice
vary as to what that showing of prejudice entails.94
A. Who Decides Whether a Party Waived Its Right to
Arbitrate by Participating in Litigation
Before there can be a determination as to the proper standard for
waiver by participation in litigation, there needs to be a determination
as to whether the waiver issue itself should be referred to an arbitra-
tor.  Arguably, if one party to a litigation moves to stay the litigation
and compel arbitration and the other party objects that the contrac-
tual right to arbitrate has been waived, the court should refer the case
to the contract arbitrator for a determination of the waiver issue.  The
usual rule, at least as to waiver based on conduct other than litigation,
is that the contract arbitrator should decide allegations of waiver.95
Additionally, in deciding Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the
Supreme Court stated “the presumption is that the arbitrator should
90. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
91. See, e.g., Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2007);
Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage, 402 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005); Patten Grading &
Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 2004).
92. See infra notes 105–50 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 151–85 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 105–50 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text.
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decide allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”96
A literal reading of that statement would seem to require referral of
issues of waiver by participation in litigation to the contract arbitrator
in most cases.
Nonetheless, since the Howsam decision, the federal courts have
generally continued to decide themselves whether there has been a
waiver of the right to arbitration by participation in litigation.97
Some courts have done so without any discussion.98  Others have held
that Howsam’s reference to waiver should be read as applying only to
waiver by failing to comply with a condition precedent of a contract,
such as failing to abide by a contractual time limit.99  For reasons dis-
cussed in Part IV of this Article,100 that consensus approach is prefer-
able to a broader, more literal reading of Howsam’s statement that
“the presumption is that the arbitrator should decide allegations of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”101
The Eighth Circuit, however, simply relying on Howsam, and with-
out any further discussion, held in National American Insurance Co.
v. Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co. that the issue of waiver
by participation in litigation should be referred to the arbitrator for
determination.102  To add to the confusion, in a later case the Eighth
Circuit decided an issue of waiver by participation in litigation with-
out referring it to the contract arbitrator and without citing Howsam
or National American.103  In a still later case in which it decided that
an employer had not waived its right to arbitrate by participating in
EEOC proceedings, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged its prior decision
in National American Insurance but did not address whether the
waiver issue before it should be referred to an arbitrator because the
parties had not raised that possibility.104
96. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (quoting Moses H.
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)).
97. See JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings, Inc., 539 F.3d 388, 393-94 (6th Cir. 2008);
Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2007); Marie v.
Allied Home Mortgage, 402 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005); Republic Ins. Co. v. Paico
Receivables LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 346–49 (5th Cir. 2004).
98. See Marie, 402 F.3d at 12 (“[T]he First Circuit has continued to decide waiver
questions due to litigation-related activities without discussing the impact of
Howsam . . . .”).
99. See JPD, Inc., 539 F.3d at 393–94; Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 217; Marie, 402 F.3d at
14; Tristar Fin. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 97 F. App’x 462 (5th
Cir. 2004).
100. See infra notes 194–207 and accompanying text.
101. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25).
102. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 328 F.3d 462, 466
(8th Cir. 2003).
103. Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 487 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2007).
104. McNamara v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 570 F.3d 950, 958 n.3 (8th Cir. 2009).
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It may be that eventually the Eighth Circuit will overrule itself
and join the consensus view that, in spite of the Supreme Court’s
statement in Howsam, determinations of waiver by participation in
litigation should be made by courts instead of arbitrators.  Neverthe-
less, until the Supreme Court clarifies Howsam’s statement about “al-
legations of waiver,” the question of who should decide issues of
waiver by participation in litigation will remain unsettled.
B. Courts That Require a Showing of Prejudice
The federal courts of appeal all recognize that under some circum-
stances participation in litigation can constitute a waiver of the right
to arbitrate, but they disagree as to what those circumstances are.105
The basic premise behind finding such a waiver is that litigating a
claim is inherently inconsistent with arbitrating a claim.106  In that
respect, waiver of the right to arbitrate is like any other conduct-based
waiver of a contractual right.107  A substantial majority of the circuits,
however, will not find a waiver of the right to arbitrate by participa-
tion in litigation unless there is a showing of prejudice to the party
resisting arbitration.108  For those circuits that require a showing of
prejudice, waiver of an agreement to arbitrate is, at least in this re-
spect, different from waiver of other contracts.109
Those circuits that require a showing of prejudice before there can
be a finding of waiver of the right to arbitrate state they do so because
of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.110  Although they dis-
agree as to just what kind of a showing must be made, they agree that
in the context of waiver by litigation, prejudice may consist of delay
and expense to the party resisting arbitration.111  Prejudice can also
105. See infra notes 116–85 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Nat’l Found. For Cancer Research  v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821
F.2d 772, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“essential question is whether . . . party has acted
inconsistently with the arbitration right”); Gen. Star Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Administra-
tia Asigurarilor de Stat, 289 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2002) (arbitration agreement
waived by completely inconsistent actions); Ritzel Commc’ns., Inc. v. Mid-Ameri-
can Cellular Tel. Co., 989 F.2d 966, 968–69 (8th Cir. 1993) (waiver of right to
arbitrate requires that party “acted inconsistently with that right”).
107. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.5 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing
waiver).
108. See infra notes 116–50 and accompanying text.
109. See Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th
Cir. 1995) (“[I]n ordinary contract law, a waiver normally is effective without
proof of consideration or detrimental reliance.”).
110. See, e.g., Lewallen, 487 F.3d at 1090 (citing strong federal policy in favor of arbi-
tration); In re Tyco Int’l Ltd. Sec. Litigation, 422 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing
strong federal policy in favor of arbitration); Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized
Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 95 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing strong federal policy
in favor of arbitration).
111. See, e.g., Republic Ins. Co. v. Paico Receivables, 383 F.3d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 2005)
(prejudice may be due to delay and expense); Thyssen, Inc. v. Calypso Shipping
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consist of some tactical advantage that would be gained by the party
seeking to move the case to an arbitral forum.112  For example, chang-
ing to an arbitral forum might give a party a second opportunity to
argue an issue that it lost on a motion in litigation.113  Prejudice may
also be found if the party seeking to arbitrate first conducted discovery
in litigation that would not have been available to it in arbitration.114
As a practical matter, the party arguing in favor of waiver will usu-
ally be able to show some level of delay, prejudice, or tactical disad-
vantage from being forced to litigate and then arbitrate.  At a
minimum, the two-forum approach to dispute resolution would cause
some delay and expense.  The issue of how much delay, expense, and
tactical disadvantage is necessary in order to satisfy the prejudice re-
quirement is, therefore, an important question.  None of the circuits
that require prejudice has formulated a precise test for determining
when that requirement has been met.  On the contrary, circuits that
require prejudice often emphasize that there is no “bright line test” for
waiver of the right to arbitrate.115
1. Circuits That Impose a “Heavy Burden” to Show Prejudice
The Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that because of the
federal policy favoring arbitration, a party seeking to establish waiver
by participation in litigation bears a “heavy burden” to prove
prejudice.116  The Fifth Circuit defines prejudice as “the inherent un-
fairness in terms of delay, expense, or damage to a party’s legal posi-
tion that occurs when the party’s opponent forces it to litigate an issue
and later seeks to arbitrate that same issue.”117  There is, however, “a
strong presumption against waiver of arbitration.”118  Thus, in Cargill
Ferrous International v. Sea Phoenix MV, the Fifth Circuit held there
was no waiver where the defendant waited until after a deposition had
Corp., 310 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (prejudice may be due to delay and ex-
pense); S & H Contractors, Inc. v. A.J. Taft Coal Co., 906 F.2d 1507, 1514 (11th
Cir. 1990) (prejudice may be due to delay and expense).
112. In re Tyco Int’l Ltd. Sec. Litigation, 422 F.3d at 46.
113. Thyssen, Inc., 310 F.3d at 105.
114. Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 349 (8th Cir. 2003).
115. In re Tyco Int’l Ltd. Sec. Litigation, 422 F.3d at 46; see also, Ehleiter v. Grapetree
Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 223 (3d Cir. 2007) (no “per se” rule as to necessary
length of delay); Lewallen, 487 F.3d at 1093 (participation in discovery not “per se
prejudicial”).
116. Subway Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Forte, 169 F.3d 324, 326 (5th Cir. 1999); Am.
Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 95 (4th Cir.
1996); Britton v. Co-op Banking Grp., 916 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990).
117. Republic Ins. Co. v. Paico Receivables LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Doctor’s Assocs. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 948 (1997)).
118. Id. at 344.
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been taken to move to compel arbitration.119  The Ninth Circuit has
not defined the required prejudice but has held that the party re-
sisting arbitration bears a “heavy burden” of proof as to all elements of
waiver, including prejudice.120
The Fourth Circuit has held that a waiver arises “when the party
seeking arbitration ‘so substantially utilized the litigation machinery
that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice’” the other
party.121  It is not sufficient that the party seeking to arbitrate filed
pleadings in the litigation and caused delay of the arbitration.122
Rather, the Fourth Circuit has emphasized “the dispositive question is
whether the party objecting to the arbitration has suffered actual
prejudice.”123  Because of the strong federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion, the Fourth Circuit will not infer waiver lightly.124
The case of MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia125 illustrates just how
heavy the burden of proving waiver by participation in litigation is in
the Fourth Circuit.  In that case, MicroStrategy’s employee, Lauricia,
signed a document requiring her to arbitrate any claim arising out of
or relating to her employment relationship with MicroStrategy.
Lauricia later filed a charge with the EEOC alleging age and sex dis-
crimination by MicroStrategy and filed a complaint with the Depart-
ment of Labor, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
MicroStrategy then sued Lauricia and her attorney in federal district
court seeking a declaratory judgment that it had not violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act and also seeking damages for the alleged theft
and disclosure of confidential information.  When that case was dis-
missed, MicroStrategy sued Lauricia and her attorney in state court.
After the EEOC issued Lauricia a right-to-sue letter, MicroStrategy
sued Lauricia again in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment
that it was not liable to Lauricia for violating federal employment
laws.  At that point, having been sued by MicroStrategy three times,
Lauricia sued MicroStrategy in federal court. MicroStrategy then
moved to dismiss Lauricia’s suit on the ground that she was required
to arbitrate.126  The district court, after consolidating the federal case
brought by MicroStrategy with the case brought by Lauricia, found
119. Cargill Ferrous Int’l v. Sea Phoenix MV, 325 F.3d 695, 701 (5th Cir. 2003).
120. See Britton, 916 F.2d at 1412.
121. Patten Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d 200, 204 (4th
Cir. 2004) (quoting Maxum Founds. Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th
Cir. 1985)).
122. Fraser v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 817 F.2d 250, 252 (4th Cir.
1987).
123. MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 251 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fraser,
817 F.2d at 252).
124. Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 95 (4th
Cir. 1996).
125. 268 F.3d at 249.
126. Id. at 246–47.
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that because of its “remarkably aggressive” litigation conduct, MicroS-
trategy waived its right to arbitrate.127  The Fourth Circuit
reversed.128
During its three court cases, MicroStrategy had deposed Lauricia
and engaged in substantial document discovery.129  The Fourth Cir-
cuit, however, found Lauricia did not carry her “heavy burden” of
proving that similar discovery would not have been available in arbi-
tration, and so she had not shown actual prejudice.130  The Fourth
Circuit acknowledged that the court cases commenced by MicroS-
trategy “involved the expenditure of substantial sums of money,” par-
ticularly because Lauricia had been forced to hire a second attorney
until the state court dismissed MicroStrategy’s claim against her first
attorney.131  The Fourth Circuit, however, did not consider those ex-
penses to constitute actual prejudice because they “primarily” related
to MicroStrategy’s state law claims against Lauricia rather than
Lauricia’s federal claims against MicroStrategy.132  The Fourth Cir-
cuit even acknowledged that Lauricia made a “strong argument that
MicroStrategy undertook its ‘remarkably aggressive’ course of litiga-
tion for the sole purpose of wearing her out, both emotionally and fi-
nancially.”133  Nonetheless, in the Fourth Circuit’s view, Lauricia had
not carried her “heavy burden of establishing that she suffered legally
significant prejudice from MicroStrategy’s litigation activities.”134
The “heavy burden” to show prejudice does not mean that partici-
pation in litigation will never be found to constitute a waiver of the
right to arbitrate in the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.135  It does
mean, however, that waiver is more difficult to establish in the
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits than in the other circuits.136  The
MicroStrategy case indicates that the Fourth Circuit may be the most
difficult circuit in which to establish the required prejudice.
127. Id. at 247–48 (quoting Lauricia v. MicroStrategy, 114 F. Supp. 2d 489, 492 (E.D.
Va. 2000)).
128. Id. at 254.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 251.
131. Id. at 250–51.
132. Id. It is not clear why that distinction should make a difference.  MicroStrategy’s
claims concerning confidential information were related to the “employment rela-
tionship” and would seem to be covered by the scope of the arbitration agreement.
133. Id. at 254.
134. Id.
135. See Fraser v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 817 F.2d 250 (4th Cir.
1987) (waiver found after years of delay, extensive discovery, and dispositive mo-
tions); Republic Ins. Co. v. Paico Receivables LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 344–47 (5th Cir.
2004) (waiver found where plaintiff asserted right to arbitrate days before trial
scheduled to begin).
136. See infra notes 137–85 and accompanying text.
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2. The First Circuit “Modicum of Prejudice” Standard
For circuits that require a showing of prejudice for waiver of the
right to arbitrate by participation in litigation, the First Circuit is at
the opposite end of the spectrum from the Fourth Circuit.  The First
Circuit has explicitly stated that it requires only a “modicum of
prejudice” to the party arguing for waiver.137  In the First Circuit, if a
party to a court case intends to invoke a right to arbitrate, “this must
be done early on in the case so resources are not needlessly
deployed.”138  The party resisting arbitration is still required to show
prejudice, but where the other party has delayed its demand for arbi-
tration, “the prejudice showing required is tame at best.”139  Thus, in
Rankin v. Allstate Insurance Co., the First Circuit relied on the
“prejudice inherent in wasted trial preparation when an arbitration
demand is made, and effectively granted, after many months of delay
and only six weeks before a long-scheduled trial.”140
3. Circuits Between a “Modicum” Standard and a “Heavy
Burden” Standard
Most circuits that require some showing of prejudice for a waiver of
the right to arbitrate by participation in litigation fall between the
“modicum” standard of the First Circuit and the “heavy burden” stan-
dard of the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.141  Generally, the cir-
cuits that require unqualified prejudice avoid any precise statement
as to what constitutes a sufficient showing, and instead list various
circumstances that may be considered in assessing prejudice, such as
137. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2003).
138. Id. at 14.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 487 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2007);
Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2007); Gen. Star
Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 289 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir.
2002);  Doctor’s Assocs. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 948 (1997); S&H Contractors, Inc. v. A.J. Taft Coal Co., Inc., 906 F.2d 1507,
1514 (11th Cir. 1990).  As has been noted above, it is unclear whether, in light of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Howsam, the Eighth Circuit will decide issues of
waiver by participation in litigation, or will simply refer such issues to the arbi-
trator for decision. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.  If the Eighth
Circuit does still decide issues of waiver by participation in litigation, then the
Lewallen case sets forth the standard it applies. See Lewallen, 487 F.3d at
1090–93.
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delay,142 expense,143 attempts to relitigate issues lost in court,144 and
the use of litigation discovery procedures.145
Highlighting the inexact nature of the prejudice inquiry, the Third
Circuit
compiled a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the prejudice inquiry: “[1]
the timeliness or lack thereof of a motion to arbitrate . . . [; 2] the degree to
which the party seeking to compel arbitration [or to stay court proceedings
pending arbitration] has contested the merits of its opponent’s claims; [3]
whether that party has informed its adversary of the intention to seek arbitra-
tion even if it has not yet filed a motion to stay the district court proceedings;
[4] the extent of its non-merits motion practice; [5] its assent to the [trial]
court’s pretrial orders; and [6] the extent to which both parties have engaged
in discovery.”146
The Third Circuit’s comprehensive list of factors highlights both
the strength and the weakness of a prejudice requirement that is
somewhere between the Fourth Circuit’s “heavy burden”147 and the
First Circuit’s “modicum.”148  Applying a multifactor analysis “goes
beyond merely counting the factors for or against finding a waiver,”149
and so allows the court flexibility to make a case-specific just determi-
nation.  The cost of that flexibility, however, is predictability.150
C. Courts That Do Not Require a Showing of Prejudice
The Seventh, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits do not re-
quire a showing of prejudice in order to find a waiver of the right to
arbitrate by participation in litigation.151  The Tenth Circuit’s ap-
proach is similar to that of the Third Circuit in that both circuits em-
ploy a multifactor, case-specific analysis to determine whether a
party’s participation in litigation constitutes a waiver of the right to
142. See Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 223 (delay a relevant factor, but no “per se” rules regard-
ing delay).
143. See S&H Contractors, Inc., 906 F.2d at 1514 (court may consider the expense
incurred in the litigation process).
144. See Thyssen, Inc. v. Calypso Shipping Corp., S.A., 310 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir.
2002).
145. See Stok & Assocs., P.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 387 F. App’x 921, 924 (11th Cir. 2010),
cert. dismissed, 131 S. Ct. 2955 (2011).
146. Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 222 (quoting Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 980
F.2d 912, 926 (3d Cir. 1992)).
147. See MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 2001).
148. See Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2003).
149. Gray Holdco, Inc. v. Cassady, 654 F.3d 444, 452 (3d Cir. 2011).
150. See id. at 451 (“the answer to the question of whether a party invoking the arbi-
tration clause waived its right to arbitrate is necessarily case specific and thus
depends on the circumstances and context of each case”).
151. Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 922–23 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir.
1995); Reid Burton Constr., Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of S. Colo., 614 F.2d
698, 702 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
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arbitrate.152  The difference between the two approaches is that the
Third Circuit uses its multifactor analysis to determine whether the
required showing of prejudice has been made;153 the Tenth Circuit
treats prejudice as one of the factors that it will consider in making a
determination.154
To determine if there has been a waiver of the right to arbitrate,
the Tenth Circuit considers:
(1) whether the party’s actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2)
whether “the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked” and the
parties “were well into preparation of a lawsuit” before the party notified the
opposing  party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested
arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period
before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a
counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) “whether impor-
tant intervening steps [e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures
not available in arbitration] had taken place”; and (6) whether the delay “af-
fected, misled, or prejudiced” the opposing party.155
The Tenth Circuit cautions that its list of factors is not necessarily
exhaustive and that the factors are not meant to be applied mechani-
cally.  Instead, they “reflect certain principles that should guide courts
in determining whether it is appropriate to deem that a party has
waived its right to demand arbitration.”156
The Seventh Circuit has explicitly held “[t]o establish a waiver of
the contractual right to arbitrate, a party need not show that it would
be prejudiced if the stay were granted and arbitration ensued.”157  In
St. Mary’s Medical Center of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prod-
ucts Company, Inc.,158 the Seventh Circuit recognized that other cir-
cuits hold there can be no waiver of the right to arbitrate “absent
prejudice to the non-defaulting party.”159  For the Seventh Circuit,
however, “[t]he essential question is whether, based on the circum-
stances, the alleged defaulting party has acted inconsistently with the
right to arbitrate.”160  Prejudice may be a “relevant factor” in assess-
ing the circumstances, but “where it is clear that a party has forgone
its right to arbitrate, a court may find waiver even if that decision did
not prejudice the non-defaulting party.”161
152. See Hill v. Ricoh Americas Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 772–73 (10th Cir. 2010); Ehleiter
v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 222 (3d Cir. 2007).
153. Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 222.
154. Hill, 603 F.3d at 772–73.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 773.
157. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir.
1995).
158. 969 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1992).
159. Id. at 590.
160. Id. at 588.
161. Id. at 590.
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2013] TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY 109
In formulating its waiver standard, the St. Mary’s court asserted
that its rejection of a prejudice requirement was not “inconsistent
with the ‘strong federal policy’ favoring arbitration.”162  The court rea-
soned that the FAA was designed to further “a policy favoring enforce-
ment of contracts, not a preference for arbitration over litigation.”163
The issue of whether a party has waived its contractual right to arbi-
tration should, therefore, be decided according to the same standard
as is applied to “waiver of any other contract right.”164  When the par-
ties to a contract with an arbitration provision both choose to litigate a
dispute, they have, “in essence, agreed . . . to litigate rather than arbi-
trate,” and the courts should enforce that agreement.165
Writing for the Seventh Circuit in Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v.
Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., Chief Judge Posner described St. Mary’s as
having established that
[i]n determining whether a waiver has occurred, the court is not to place its
thumb on the scales; the federal policy favoring arbitration is, at least so far
as concerns the interpretation of an arbitration clause, merely a policy of
treating such clauses no less hospitably than other contractual provisions.  To
establish a waiver of the contractual right to arbitrate, a party need not show
that it would be prejudiced if the stay were granted and arbitration
ensued.166
Cabinetree then took what it describes as “the next step in the evolu-
tion of doctrine,” and held “that an election to proceed before a
nonarbitral tribunal for the resolution of a contractual dispute is a
presumptive waiver of the right to arbitrate.”167  That is essentially
the opposite approach to waiver by participation in litigation that is
applied in the majority of circuits.168  The Seventh Circuit’s presump-
tion that a party that chooses to litigate has waived its right to arbi-
trate can be overcome under “abnormal” circumstances, in which case
the court should consider any prejudice to the party resisting arbitra-
tion, as well as the diligence of the party seeking arbitration.169
The District of Columbia Circuit has long been of the view that no




165. Id. at 591.
166. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir.
1995).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 487 F.3d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir.
2007) (resolve any doubts against finding of waiver); Cargill Ferrous Int’l v. Sea
Phoenix MV, 325 F.3d 695, 700–01 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying presumption against
waiver); Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88,
95 (4th Cir. 1996) (circumstances giving rise to waiver not to be lightly inferred).
169. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc., 50 F.3d at 391.
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bitrate by participation in litigation.170  Until recently, it was similar
to the Tenth Circuit171 in that it considered prejudice to be one of the
factors that a court should consider in determining whether there had
been a waiver of the right to arbitrate.172  A showing of prejudice,
however, was not essential so long as “under the totality of the circum-
stances, the defaulting party . . . acted inconsistently with the arbitra-
tion right.”173  In formulating that standard, the District of Columbia
Circuit reasoned that
the “strong federal policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements” is
based upon the enforcement of contract, rather than a preference for arbitra-
tion as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. . . . Thus, the question of
whether there has been waiver in the arbitration agreement context should be
analyzed in much the same way as in any other contractual context.174
The District of Columbia Circuit’s recent decision in Zuckerman
Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg175 indicates that the court’s thinking on
waiver by participation in litigation has now evolved in a manner sim-
ilar to that of the Seventh Circuit.  In Zuckerman Spaeder, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit noted that its “totality of the circumstances”
approach was “fact-bound,” and that the court had “established few
bright-line rules.”176  The lack of a defined standard had “imposed a
cost upon both litigants and the district court.”177  To address that
concern, Zuckerman Spaeder sets forth the following standard:
A defendant seeking a stay pending arbitration under Section 3 [of the FAA]
who has not invoked the right to arbitrate on the record at the first available
opportunity, typically in filing his first responsive pleading or motion to dis-
miss, has presumptively forfeited that right. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (enumer-
ating affirmative defenses defendant must raise in answer or else forfeit).  A
defendant who delays seeking a stay pending arbitration until after his first
available opportunity might still prevail on a later stay motion provided his
delay did not prejudice his opponent or the court.178
The District of Columbia Circuit has thus joined the Seventh Circuit
in creating a presumption that a party that chooses to litigate loses its
contractual right to arbitrate.179
170. See Cabinetree of Wis., Inc., 50 F.3d at 390 (stating that the District of Columbia
Circuit does not “insist on evidence of prejudice beyond what is inherent”); Nat’l
Found. for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 777
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“waiver may be found absent any showing of prejudice”).
171. See supra notes 151–56 and accompanying text.
172. See Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research, 821 F.2d at 777.
173. Id. at 774.
174. Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218–24 (1985)).
175. 646 F.3d 919 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
176. Id. at 922.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 922–23.
179. The Zuckerman Spaeder standard only references the right of a “defendant seek-
ing a stay pending arbitration.” Id.  It is arguable that a different standard
should apply to a plaintiff based on the plaintiff’s initiation of the litigation pro-
cess and a defendant’s limited time to respond to a complaint.
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Zuckerman Spaeder broke new ground by opining that
to be technically correct as well as clear . . . forfeiture, not waiver, is the appro-
priate standard for evaluating a late-filed motion under Section 3 of the FAA.
Forfeiture is the “failure to make a timely assertion of a right” and, unlike
waiver, entails no element of intent.180
The District of Columbia Circuit is unique in using the term “forfei-
ture” rather than “waiver” to refer to the loss of the right to arbitrate
as a result of participation in litigation.  It is a departure from conven-
tion that does not seem justified by the court’s observation that waiver
entails an element of intent.  As Professor Farnsworth states, al-
though “waiver” is often defined as “ ‘the intentional relinquishment of
a known right,’ this is a misleading definition.”181  It is “misleading in
that the word ‘known’ must be read as going only to the facts and not
to their legal effect.  As Williston said, ‘blameworthy ignorance is suf-
ficient.’”182  The word “waiver,” therefore, adequately describes a situ-
ation in which a party knowingly participates in litigation, even
though it may not realize the legal effect of such participation on the
right to arbitrate.183
Overall, a review of the approaches of the three circuits that do not
require prejudice shows that they, like the circuits that do require
prejudice, do not have a uniform approach to the issue of waiver by
participation in litigation.  The Tenth Circuit employs a multifactor
analysis in which prejudice may be considered and which is not to be
mechanically applied.184  The Seventh and the District of Columbia
Circuits apply a presumption of waiver in cases where the parties
have participated in litigation.185
180. Id. at 922.  One commentator has proposed that neither waiver nor forfeiture is
correct in this context and that the courts should analyze the issue as one of
discharge. See Paul Bennett IV, Note,“Waiving” Goodbye to Arbitration: A Con-
tractual Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609, 1669–75 (2012).
181. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.5 (3d ed. 2004).
182. Id. at § 8.5 n.6 (quoting S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 685 (1st ed. 1920)). Lewis v.
The Keiser Sch., No. 11-62176-Civ., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147150 (S.D. Fla. Oct.
12, 2012), provides an example of such blameworthy ignorance.  In Lewis, the
defendant employer waited seven months before moving to compel arbitration.
The defendant’s proffered excuse for the delay was that it had been unable to find
a copy of the arbitration agreement. Id. at *2.  The court found that the defen-
dant had waived its right to arbitrate and that the defendant “should have
known” whether an arbitration agreement existed. Id. at *8.
183. See Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2003) (delay by litigant
in seeking arbitration “commonly addressed under the heading ‘waiver,’ here
meaning forfeiture rather than intentional relinquishment”); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS, § 84 cmt. b (“The common definition of waiver may lead to
the incorrect inference that the promisor must know his legal rights and must
intend the legal effect of the promise. . . . [I]t is sufficient if he has reason to know
the essential facts.”).
184. Hill v. Ricoh Americas Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 772–73 (10th Cir. 2010).
185. Zuckerman Spaeder, 646 F.3d at 922–23; Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid
Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995).
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D. Conclusions on the Current State of the Law
The law is unsettled as to when participation in litigation will be
found to constitute a waiver of the right to arbitrate.  There is broad
but not unanimous consensus that the issue of whether there has been
a waiver by participation in litigation is for a court rather than an
arbitrator to decide.186  Most circuits will not find such a waiver un-
less the participation in litigation is shown to have caused prejudice to
the party resisting arbitration.  Those circuits that require prejudice
have different standards for determining how much prejudice is
enough.187  The three circuits that do not require prejudice also have
different standards for determining when there has been a waiver, al-
though the Seventh Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit have
adopted similar approaches that presume that a party waives its right
to arbitrate when it chooses to litigate.188
The unsettled state of the law of waiver of the contractual right to
arbitrate is undesirable.  Besides the logical inconsistency of different
federal courts interpreting the same federal statute in different ways,
the District of Columbia Circuit correctly observed that uncertainty
imposes costs on the parties and on the judicial system.189  Since par-
ties typically include arbitration provisions in their contracts in the
hope of reducing costs, a consistent resolution of the waiver issue is
desirable.
IV. A PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF THE WAIVER BY
PARTICIPATION IN LITIGATION ISSUE
Given the current unsettled state of the law and the conflict among
the circuits, there is an obvious need for a single federal rule concern-
ing when a party’s participation in arbitration will constitute a waiver
of the contractual right to arbitrate.  The first issue that must be ad-
dressed in fashioning a single federal rule is whether the issue of
waiver by participation in litigation is properly one for a court rather
than an arbitrator to decide.  As is discussed above,190 there is near
unanimity among the circuits that the issue should be decided by a
court.  As is discussed below,191 there are good reasons for that con-
sensus, and it should be universally accepted.
The more difficult issue in fashioning a uniform federal rule is how
to resolve the split in the circuits as to whether the party resisting
arbitration should be required to show prejudice before there can be a
186. See supra notes 95–104 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 105–50 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 151–85 and accompanying text.
189. See Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP, 646 F.3d at 922.
190. See supra notes 95–104 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 194–207 and accompanying text.
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 61 Side A      08/28/2013   10:13:22
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 61 Side A      08/28/2013   10:13:22
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-1\NEB104.txt unknown Seq: 28 14-AUG-13 9:55
2013] TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY 113
finding of waiver by participation in litigation.  A uniform federal rule
addressing that issue should satisfy three criteria.  First, the rule
should be consistent with the FAA and the policies underlying the
FAA.  Second, the rule should be consistent with the doctrines of arbi-
trability established by the Supreme Court in the years since the FAA
was enacted.192  Third, the rule should advance, or at least not hinder,
the goal of efficient dispute resolution.193  Those criteria are best sat-
isfied by a rule that does not require a showing of prejudice.  The pol-
icy goals of the FAA and the interests of efficient dispute resolution
are better served by a rule that requires parties to choose their forum
at the pleading stage of their dispute.
A. Waiver by Participation in Litigation Should Be
Determined by a Court, Not an Arbitrator
With the exception of the Eighth Circuit, a general consensus has
developed that allegations of waiver by participation in litigation
should be determined by the court, not referred to an arbitrator.194
The Eighth Circuit departed from that view based on the Supreme
Court’s statement in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. that “the
presumption is that the arbitrator should decide allegations of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”195  There are, however, sev-
eral good reasons for accepting the consensus view that the Howsam
Court did not intend the word “waiver” to apply to allegations of
waiver by participation in litigation.
First, the word “waiver” is a broad term that, in Professor Corbin’s
words, “covers a multitude of sins.”196  The Howsam case concerned
the issue of whether a court or an arbitrator should rule on the proce-
dural issue of whether the plaintiff’s claim was time-barred pursuant
to the six-year limitations period contained in the rules of the agreed
upon arbitral forum.197  As the First, Third, Fifth and Sixth Circuits
have held, it seems likely that Howsam intended the word “waiver” to
refer only to waiver by failing to comply with a condition precedent of
a contract, such as commencing a procedure within a certain time pe-
riod, not to waiver by inconsistent conduct.198
192. See supra notes 36–83 and accompanying text.
193. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633
(1985) (arbitration agreements desirable for “streamlined proceeding and expedi-
tious results”).
194. See supra notes 95–104 and accompanying text.
195. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002).
196. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.5 (3d ed. 2004) (quoting Arthur L. Corbin,
Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 754 (1919)).
197. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83–86.
198. See JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings, Inc., 539 F.3d 388, 393–94 (6th Cir. 2008);
Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2007); Marie v.
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 61 Side B      08/28/2013   10:13:22
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 61 Side B      08/28/2013   10:13:22
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-1\NEB104.txt unknown Seq: 29 14-AUG-13 9:55
114 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:86
Second, in determining that the arbitrator should decide whether a
claim was time-barred under the rules of the arbitration forum, How-
sam reasoned that “parties to an arbitration contract would normally
expect a forum-based decisionmaker to decide forum-specific procedu-
ral gateway matters.”199  Applying that rationale to the issue of
waiver by participation in litigation, the parties to a pending litigation
would expect the forum-based decision maker, that is, the judge, to
decide whether a litigation-based waiver had occurred.  The underly-
ing rationale of Howsam, fulfilling the expectations of the parties,
thus weighs in favor of having the court decide issues of waiver by
participation in litigation.
Third, the Howsam Court based its decision in part on the judg-
ment that arbitrators may be “comparatively more expert” than the
courts at applying the procedural requirements of the parties’ con-
tract.200  For issues of waiver by participation in litigation, the oppo-
site is true.  It is the court where the litigation has been proceeding
that will have firsthand knowledge of the relevant activity.201  To the
extent that either a court or an arbitrator has superior expertise in
determining whether there has been a waiver by litigation, the court
would have the advantage.202
Fourth, court determination as to whether there has been waiver
by participation in litigation is consistent with Section 3 of the FAA,
which empowers federal courts to stay litigation pending arbitration
provided “the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding
with such arbitration.”203  There is general agreement that the word
“default” encompasses waiver by participation in litigation.204  Fur-
thermore, an allegation of waiver by participation in litigation does
not allege that all rights under the relevant contract have been
waived.  Rather, the argument goes specifically to the enforceability of
the arbitration provision in isolation.  Having the issue decided by a
court rather than an arbitrator is, therefore, consistent with the arbi-
trability doctrine of severability.205
Fifth, in cases involving allegations of waiver by participation in
litigation, the parties have, at least initially, chosen to involve the ju-
dicial system.  Switching back and forth between arbitration and liti-
Allied Home Mortgage, 402 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005); Tristar Fin. Ins. Agency,
Inc. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 97 F. App’x 462 (5th Cir. 2004).
199. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 86.
200. Id. at 84.
201. See Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 218; Marie, 402 F.3d at 13.
202. Marie, 402 F.3d at 13 (“Judges are well-trained to recognize abusive forum
shopping.”).
203. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
204. See, e.g., Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 217; Marie, 402 F.3d at 14; Patten Grading & Pav-
ing, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 2004).
205. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
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gation can be an abuse of the judicial system for purposes of bad faith
delay or forum shopping.206  Once the judicial process is invoked, the
courts should be empowered to control their own processes.207
For these reasons, as well as the great bulk of precedent from the
circuit courts, issues of waiver by participation in litigation should be
decided by courts, not arbitrators.  The problem thus becomes deter-
mining what standard the federal courts should apply when making
that determination.
B. Waiver by Participation in Litigation Should Not Require
a Showing of Prejudice
1. Policy Considerations Under the FAA
The most basic conflict among the circuits on the issue of waiver of
the right to arbitration by participation in litigation concerns whether
the party resisting arbitration must show prejudice.208  The root cause
of that conflict is an inherent disagreement as to whether the primary
policy of the FAA is a policy favoring arbitration or a policy favoring
enforcement of arbitration agreements on the same basis as other con-
tracts.  Courts that require prejudice routinely state that there is a
strong policy favoring arbitration and that all doubts concerning arbi-
trability must be decided in favor or arbitration.209  Because courts
are predisposed to refer cases to arbitration whenever possible, they
only find waiver of the right to arbitrate in cases where a sense of
unfairness overcomes the policy in favor of arbitration.210  Because
that is a necessarily ad hoc determination, different approaches to
finding prejudice have developed.211
206. See Hill v. Ricoh Americas Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 773 (10th Cir. 2010) (“An impor-
tant consideration in assessing waiver is whether the party now seeking arbitra-
tion is improperly manipulating the judicial process.”).
207. See Marie, 402 F.3d at 13; Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 218.
208. See supra notes 105–85 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 487 F.3d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir.
2007) (because of “strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, any doubts con-
cerning waiver of arbitrability should be resolved in favor of arbitration”); Cargill
Ferrous Int’l v. Sea Phoenix MV, 325 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 2003) (presumption
against waiver because of strong federal policy in favor or arbitration); Maxum
Founds. Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985) (default not to be
lightly inferred in light of federal policy favoring arbitration).
210. See Republic Ins. Co. v. Paico Receivables LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 2004)
(for purpose of finding waiver of right to arbitrate, prejudice refers to “inherent
unfairness”); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 948 (1997) (for purpose of finding waiver of right to arbitrate, prejudice
refers to “inherent unfairness”).
211. See supra notes 105–50 and accompanying text.
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The District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits, on the other
hand,212 have emphasized that the policy behind the FAA is that
agreements to arbitrate should be placed “on the same footing as other
contracts.”213  The FAA policy is “based upon the enforcement of con-
tract, rather than a preference for arbitration as an alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanism.”214  Therefore, in assessing whether a
party to litigation has waived its right to arbitrate,
the court is not to place its thumb on the scales; the federal policy favoring
arbitration is, at least so far as concerns the interpretation of an arbitration
clause, merely a policy of treating such clauses no less hospitably than other
contractual provisions.215
Using that policy as a starting point, the conclusion that waiver of the
right to arbitrate requires no special finding of prejudice naturally fol-
lows because “in ordinary contract law, a waiver normally is effective
without proof of consideration or detrimental reliance.”216
Compared to the circuits that require a showing of prejudice, the
District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits have a sounder approach to
the policy considerations relevant to the waiver inquiry.  Their ap-
proach is consistent with the words of the statute, which require a
federal court to stay pending litigation if “the applicant for the stay is
not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.”217  It is reasonable
to conclude that a party that files a complaint or an answer in litiga-
tion without mentioning any desire to arbitrate is “in default” under
the FAA.  Furthermore, the District of Columbia and Seventh Circuit
approach is consistent with the legislative history of the FAA, which
states:
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the
bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement.  He can
no longer refuse to perform his contract when it becomes disadvantageous to
him.  An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other con-
tracts, where it belongs.218
212. As is discussed above, the Tenth Circuit also does not strictly require prejudice
but does consider prejudice as one of the factors to be considered when determin-
ing whether there has been a waiver of the right to arbitrate.  Unlike the Seventh
and District of Columbia Circuits, the Tenth Circuit has not adopted a presump-
tion that a party waives its right to arbitrate by participating in litigation. See
supra notes 151–56 and accompanying text.
213. See St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prods. Co., 969
F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 1992); Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards
& Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
214. Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research, 821 F.2d at 774.
215. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir.
1995).
216. Id. at 390 (citing E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.5 (2d ed. 1990); 3A AR-
THUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 753 (1960)).
217. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
218. H.R. REP. No. 68-96 (1924), quoted in Kulukundis Shipping Co., S.A. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (1942).
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The District of Columbia and Seventh Circuit approach to the rele-
vant policy considerations is also consistent with Supreme Court pre-
cedent.  The Supreme Court has stated that the FAA “embodies the
national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements
on equal footing with all other contracts.”219  Courts do not require a
showing of prejudice to establish waiver of other contract rights and so
should not require it for arbitration agreements.
In addition, a policy that stresses “enforcement of contract, rather
than a preference for arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism”220 is not inconsistent with a strong federal policy favor-
ing arbitration.221  A court decision that allows a party that partici-
pated in litigation to then compel arbitration moves one case out of the
court system, but it encourages future court cases by parties with ar-
bitration agreements who now know they can litigate initially without
losing the right to arbitrate later.  The Fourth Circuit case of MicroS-
trategy, Inc. v. Lauricia222 is one example.  In this case, MicroStrategy
brought two federal cases against Lauricia before being permitted to
switch to arbitration.223  It seems unlikely that those cases would ever
have been initiated if the Fourth Circuit had a rule requiring parties
to choose their forum at the time of pleading.  The Fourth Circuit rule
placing a “heavy burden” on Lauricia to show prejudice was putatively
based on a federal policy favoring arbitration, but the result of the rule
was more litigation.224  From a broader perspective than the individ-
ual litigant seeking to move a case to arbitration, the prejudice re-
quirement does not encourage parties with an arbitration agreement
to proceed expeditiously to arbitration.  It encourages them, at least
initially, to litigate.
2. Application of Established Doctrines
Courts that require a showing of prejudice for waiver of the right to
arbitrate sometimes cite the maxim that doubts should be resolved in
favor of arbitration.225  That rule, however, is not correctly applied to
219. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (emphasis
added); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011)
(acknowledging the national policy favoring arbitration and arbitration
agreements).
220. Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research, 821 F.2d 772, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
221. See St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prods. Co., 969
F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding waiver without prejudice “not inconsistent
with the ‘strong federal policy’ favoring arbitration”).
222. See supra notes 125–34 and accompanying text.
223. MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 247–48 (4th Cir. 2001).
224. Id. at 249–50.
225. See, e.g., Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 487 F.3d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir.
2007) (“doubts concerning waiver of arbitrability should be resolved in favor of
arbitration”); In re Tyco Int’l Ltd. Sec. Litigation, 422 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 2005)
(“reasonable doubts as to whether a party has waived the right to arbitrate
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issues of waiver by conduct of the parties.  Correctly stated, the rule,
which has its genesis in the landmark case of United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,226 is that doubts as to
“whether a particular merits-related dispute” is within the scope of the
arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of arbitration.227  It is
based on the need to keep courts from becoming “entangled in the con-
struction of the substantive provisions” of the parties’ agreement be-
cause construction of the agreement is properly in the province of the
contract arbitrator.228
The Supreme Court’s decision in Granite Rock Co. v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters229 makes clear that the rule that doubts
should be resolved in favor of arbitration does not apply to cases con-
cerning contract formation.  In Granite Rock, the issue of arbitrability
hinged on whether the relevant contract had been ratified, and thus
formed, by a certain date.230  In determining that issue, the Court did
not resolve any doubts in favor of arbitration.  Rather, the Court said
the presumption in favor of arbitrability applies “only where a validly
formed and enforceable arbitration agreement is ambiguous about
whether it covers the dispute at hand.”231  Because the federal policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes “cannot be divorced from the
first principle that . . . [a]rbitration is strictly ‘a matter of consent,’ the
courts must independently determine issues of contract formation.”232
Whether a party to an agreement has waived its right to arbitrate
by virtue of its participation in litigation is more like an issue of con-
tract formation than an issue of whether a particular dispute fits
within the scope of an arbitration clause.  The waiver issue is com-
pletely separate from the merits of the underlying dispute.  There is,
therefore, no danger of the court becoming entangled in construing the
substantive provisions of the contract in order to determine an issue of
waiver.  In a waiver case, the issue is whether the arbitration clause
has ceased to be binding in light of the parties’ conduct.  As the Sev-
should be resolved in favor of arbitration”); Kramer v. Hammond, 943 F.2d 176,
178 (2d Cir. 1991) (“doubts concerning the scope of arbitration issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration”).
226. See supra notes 36–44 and accompanying text.
227. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944–45 (1995); see also Gran-
ite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (the policy is
to resolve doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues in favor of arbitration);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582–83 (1960) (doubts as to whether “ ‘the arbitration clause is not susceptible of
[sic] an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute . . . should be resolved in
favor of coverage’”).
228. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 585.
229. 130 S. Ct. 2847.
230. Id. at 2860.
231. Id. at 2858.
232. Id. at 2857.
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enth Circuit explained, the issue can be viewed as whether, by their
conduct, the parties have voluntarily agreed to litigate rather than
arbitrate; if they have, then their new agreement to litigate should be
no less enforceable than their old agreement to arbitrate.233  A rule
that resolves doubts in favor of arbitrability is, therefore, inappropri-
ate in the waiver context.
An arbitrability doctrine that should apply in the waiver context is
that decisions on arbitrability should be consistent with the con-
tracting parties’ expectations.234  It is, therefore, appropriate to con-
sider what the parties would reasonably have expected concerning
waiver of the right to arbitrate at the time they entered a contract
with an arbitration provision.  Determining such hypothetical expec-
tations necessarily requires the use of normative assumptions.  Thus,
in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Supreme Court made
the reasonable assumption that “parties to an arbitration agreement
would normally expect a forum-based decisionmaker to decide forum-
specific procedural gateway matters.”235
In determining what parties might reasonably expect concerning
waiver of the right to arbitrate by participation in litigation, it is ap-
propriate to consider Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), which pro-
vides that “[i]n responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively
state any avoidance or affirmative defense . . . .”236  Rule 8(c)(1) lists
particular affirmative defenses that must be pleaded, including “arbi-
tration and award.”237
The circuits do not agree as to whether the requirement of Rule
8(c) to plead “arbitration and award” applies to a situation in which
there is a contractual right to arbitrate the dispute but there has not
yet been an arbitration award.  In a case in which it found that the
defendant had waived its right to arbitrate, the Sixth Circuit stated
that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires a defendant to
plead arbitration as an affirmative defense.”238  The Fourth Circuit
has similarly stated that, pursuant to Rule 8(c), “the affirmative de-
fense of arbitration must be raised” in the answer.239  The Fourth Cir-
cuit also found, however, that because failure to plead an affirmative
233. See St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prods. Co., Inc.,
969 F.2d 585, 591 (7th Cir. 1992).
234. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773–74 (2010)
(“courts and arbitrators must ‘give effect to the contractual rights and expecta-
tions of the parties’”) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leeland Stan-
ford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
235. 537 U.S. 79, 86 (2002).
236. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
237. Id.
238. Manasher v NECC Telecom, 310 F. App’x. 804, 806 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009).
239. Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 96 (4th
Cir. 1996).
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 64 Side B      08/28/2013   10:13:22
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 64 Side B      08/28/2013   10:13:22
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-1\NEB104.txt unknown Seq: 35 14-AUG-13 9:55
120 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:86
defense may be excused so long as there is no prejudice, the analysis of
the waiver issue is unaffected.240  The District of Columbia Circuit
cited Rule 8(c) in support of its holding that a defendant “who has not
invoked the right to arbitrate on the record at the first available op-
portunity, typically in filing his first responsive pleading or motion to
dismiss, has presumptively forfeited that right.”241  In contrast to the
Fourth, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits, the Second Circuit
and Tenth Circuit have each held that Rule 8(c) only applies if an arbi-
trator has issued an award.242
Regardless of which circuits are correct as to whether the term “ar-
bitration and award” should be read as requiring a defendant to plead
arbitration when there has not been an award, Rule 8(c)’s list of af-
firmative defenses is not “intended to be exhaustive.”243  The rule’s
requirement to state “any avoidance or affirmative defense” is gener-
ally read to include any defense that cannot be raised by “a simple
denial in the answer.”244  Where there is any doubt as to whether an
allegation falls within the scope of Rule 8(c)’s residual clause, prudent
counsel would be expected to plead it “in order to avoid waiving an
otherwise valid defense.”245  Therefore, even if the term “arbitration
and award” in Rule 8(c)(1) is construed not to include the affirmative
defense that a dispute should be arbitrated, defendants should still be
expected to plead arbitration as an affirmative defense if they do not
intend to waive that right.
A waiver rule that requires parties to assert their right to arbitrate
by the time the defendant files its answer would be consistent with
Rule 8(c) and consistent with what the parties should reasonably ex-
pect.  A plaintiff that initiates litigation acts inconsistently with an
expectation that its claim will be arbitrated.  Such a plaintiff has, by
serving and filing its complaint, offered to litigate what may have oth-
erwise been an arbitrable dispute.  If a defendant answers such a com-
plaint without raising the defense of arbitration, that defendant
should, consistent with Rule 8(c), expect that it has waived its right to
later claim that the dispute should be arbitrated.  By answering the
complaint without raising arbitration, the defendant accepts the
plaintiff’s offer to litigate what may have otherwise been an arbitrable
dispute.  If, on the other hand, the defendant does raise arbitration in
its answer, then its right to insist on arbitration has been preserved,
240. Patten Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d 200, 205 n.3
(4th Cir. 2004).
241. Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 922–23 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
242. Hill v. Ricoh Americas Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 771 (10th Cir. 2010); Thyssen, Inc. v.
Calypso Shipping Corp., 310 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2002).
243. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1271, at 581 (3d ed. 2004).
244. Id. at 585.
245. Id.
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 65 Side A      08/28/2013   10:13:22
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 65 Side A      08/28/2013   10:13:22
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-1\NEB104.txt unknown Seq: 36 14-AUG-13 9:55
2013] TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY 121
and the plaintiff has been put on notice that there is no agreement to
litigate the dispute.
3. Efficient Dispute Resolution
As the Supreme Court recently stated, “[t]he overarching purpose
of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to
facilitate streamlined proceedings.”246  Typically, an arbitration
clause is included in a contract precisely for the purpose of resolving
disputes quickly and efficiently.247  An approach to arbitrability that
hinders efficient dispute resolution should be avoided not only because
it increases costs and hurts commerce, but also because it frustrates
the intent of Congress and the intent of arbitration agreements.
The current state of the law regarding waiver by participation in
litigation encourages inefficient dispute resolution.  First, the law is
unsettled, which by itself imposes costs on the dispute resolution pro-
cess.  The standard for waiver by participation in litigation changes
from circuit to circuit, and the circuits that require prejudice assess
whether the standard has been met on a case-specific basis.248  Sec-
ond, the majority of circuits require a showing of prejudice before
there can be a finding of waiver by participation in litigation.249  The
prejudice requirement encourages a dispute resolution process of liti-
gation and arbitration, rather than litigation or arbitration.
Attorneys do not make choice of forum decisions lightly.250  Cir-
cuits that require a showing of prejudice before there can be a waiver
of the right to arbitrate encourage parties to try litigation first, secure
in the knowledge that they will have at least some leeway before they
have to decide whether they would prefer arbitration after all.  For
example, it would be entirely rational for a party’s attorneys to decide
to switch to arbitration if they did not like the judge assigned to the
case or if there was some indication, however subtle, that the case was
not going as well as might have been hoped.251  This is essentially a
246. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
247. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2008).
248. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.  The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, in contrast, clarified its standard in recognition of the fact that a vague stan-
dard imposes costs on both litigants and the court system. See Zuckerman
Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 922 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
249. See supra notes 105–50 and accompanying text.
250. See Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th
Cir. 1995) (“Parties know how important it is to settle on a forum at the earliest
possible opportunity, and the failure of either of them to move promptly for arbi-
tration is powerful evidence that they made their election—against arbitration.”).
251. In Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc., the reason that the defendant gave for waiting
before moving to stay the litigation was that it wanted “to weigh its options.” Id.
The Seventh Circuit correctly treated that reason as an abuse of the dispute reso-
lution system. Id.
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form of forum shopping that allows a party to try out the litigation
forum before making a final decision.  It is also a form of forum shop-
ping that increases the cost of resolving disputes by adding a litigation
stage to what should be an arbitration process.252
It is possible for a party to participate in litigation before seeking
to arbitrate as a result of innocent mistake.  For example, in Patten
Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Building, Inc., the defendant
was a successor in interest that claimed it did not know the terms of
the contract until after discovery had started.253  Under contract law,
however, a finding of waiver does not require that the party have ac-
tual knowledge of its legal rights.  It is sufficient if the waiving party
had “reason to know the essential facts.”254  Given that the impact of
the delay is the same regardless of the intent255 and given that waiver
of the right to arbitrate does not result in the loss of any substantive
right, it does not seem unduly onerous to charge the parties to a con-
tractual dispute with constructive knowledge of the terms of the un-
derlying contract.
The District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits have correctly em-
phasized the importance of choosing a forum “at the earliest possible
opportunity in order to economize on the resources, both public and
private, consumed in dispute resolution.”256  Courts that allow the
parties to litigate until some point in the process at which prejudice is
deemed to have occurred encourage the parties to an arbitration
agreement to try litigating a dispute before deciding whether to arbi-
trate.  A rule that requires the parties to choose their forum at the
pleading stage encourages the efficient resolution of disputes and thus
effectuates the purpose of the FAA.
252. MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. 2001), offers a particularly
egregious example of an increase in costs as a result of the prejudice requirement.
In MicroStrategy, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that there was a strong case
that the plaintiff undertook its course of litigation for the sole purpose of wearing
out the defendant “both emotionally and financially.” Id. at 254.  Nonetheless,
the plaintiff was found to have not waived the right to switch to arbitration be-
cause the defendant did not prove prejudice. Id.
253. 380 F.3d 200, 205 (4th Cir. 2004).
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 cmts. a–b (1979); see also E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.5 (3d ed. 2004) (stating “blameworthy ignorance” is
sufficient for waiver).
255. See Reid Burton Constr., Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of S. Colo., 614 F.2d
698, 702 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
256. Cabinetree of Wis. Inc., 50 F.3d at 91; see also Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auf-
fenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 922–23 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating a party has presumptively
forfeited its right to arbitration if it fails to “invoke[ ] the right to arbitrate on the
record at the first available opportunity”).
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V. CONCLUSION
The law of arbitrability is still developing.  On the issue of when
participation in litigation will constitute a waiver of the right to arbi-
trate, the law is particularly unsettled.  Although a consensus seems
to be forming that such issues are for a court rather than an arbitrator
to determine, there is no consensus as to the standard that the courts
should apply.  The circuits are split as to whether the party alleging
waiver needs to show prejudice and, if so, what that showing of
prejudice entails.  Although it is currently the minority view, a rule
that does not require a showing of prejudice better effectuates the poli-
cies of the FAA than a rule that does require a showing of prejudice.  A
rule that requires the parties to elect their forum by the pleading
stage is consistent with the law of arbitrability generally, with Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), and with the goal of efficient dispute
resolution.
